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COMMENTS

TRANS-ATLANTIC GHOST BUSTING: THE FAILED
ATTEMPT TO DISPOSE OF THE CHESAPEAKE
"GHOST FLEET" IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

For over fifty years a fleet of obsolete and deteriorating ships
has been anchored in Virginia's Chesapeake Bay.1 The fleet,
owned and managed by the United States government, has become more than a simple eyesore over the past decade due to the
environmental contaminants onboard many of the vessels. 2
Aware that domestic disposal of this "ghost fleet" was proceeding
slower than expected, Congress created a pilot program in 2002 to
explore the possibility of disposal abroad in an environmentally
friendly and cost-effective manner.3 During the past five years
such a program was set in motion, but the results were far from
what Congress had hoped to achieve. The program produced constant confusion and delay, accompanied by multiple lawsuits and
administrative hearings in the United States and the United
Kingdom ("UK"). 4 Though an English ship-breaking company
named Able UK ("Able") continues its attempts to begin operations in England, its efforts to build the necessary facilities so far
have been unsuccessful, and the pilot program has been terminated.5 Able was repeatedly thwarted, first by the UK Environ-

1. See Scott Harper, Ghost Fleet Will Not Be Dismantled by Deadline, VIRGINIANPILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Mar. 23, 2006, at B3.
2. See id.
3. See Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-314, §
3504(c), 116 Stat. 2458, 2755 (2002).
4. See Scott Harper, No More "Ghost Fleet" Ships Will Be Sent to Britain for Scrapping, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), June 1, 2007, at B1.
5. See id.
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ment Agency ("UKEA")6 and later by the Hartlepool, England
planning council. 7 Able began its efforts by negotiating with the
UKEA, and worked for four years to honor the contract it procured under the international pilot program. Four years after
Able began its efforts, however, the ships that sailed from the
Chesapeake were still stranded on the shores of England and the
program was scrapped.' The failure of the program was largely
due to a series of decisions handed down over a period of two
years by the thirteen-member Hartlepool planning council. 9
This comment critically examines the pilot program approved
by Congress in 2002 and the decisions made by Hartlepool's
planning council which led to the international disposal program's demise. In order to fully explain the pilot program, this
comment first details the history of the Chesapeake ghost fleet
and its place in the U.S. government's National Defense Reserve
Fleet ("NDRF") and Vessel Disposal Program. Additionally, it explores the obstacles that have prevented international disposal of
the fleet in the past and highlights the failure of the Maritime
Administration ("MARAD") to develop a workable plan for ship
disposal by the congressionally mandated deadline of September
2006.
Part I of this comment details the history of the NDRF and its
usefulness throughout the past eighty years. Part II explains the
administrative obstacles faced by MARAD in operating the Vessel
Disposal Program, both domestically and abroad. Part III details
the creation of the international pilot program and discusses the
program's resulting U.S. litigation. Part IV examines the difficulties encountered by Able UK in beginning operations in Hartlepool, and the comment concludes by critiquing the failure of the
pilot program and assessing feasible options for safe and timely
disposal of the Chesapeake ghost fleet.

6. See Green Group Wins "Ghost Fleet" Rule, BBC NEWS, Dec. 8, 2003, http://news.
bbc.co.uk/l/hi/england/tees/3301419.stm.
7. Harper, supra note 4.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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I.

HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET

The Chesapeake ghost fleet consists of dozens of warships and
merchant-class ships anchored near Fort Eustis, Virginia, where
the James River empties into the Chesapeake Bay.' ° These vessels, strung together in rows across the river, are part of the U.S.
military's NDRF, a program currently administered by MARAD,
which is an agency of the U.S. Department of Transportation. 1
MARAD oversees operation of the three NDRF fleet divisions,
which include the James River Fleet, commonly referred to by locals as the Chesapeake "ghost fleet" or "mothball fleet," as well as
the Beaumont Reserve Fleet in Texas and the Suisun Bay Reserve Fleet in Benicia, California.12
The rapidly deteriorating condition of many of these obsolete
vessels has become the source of much concern lately in the
Chesapeake region. 3 A large number of these war-built ships
contain alarming amounts of asbestos, lead paint, gas, oil, and
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs"), all of which present significant environmental concerns. 4 As these obsolete ships continue
to deteriorate, the surrounding bay is put at risk."5 Many local
residents fear the consequences to their environment that could
result from another storm the size of Hurricane Isabelle. 6 One
study predicted that if just two of the fleet's ships were damaged
in a storm, waste would spread approximately fifty miles up and
down the James River, contaminating nearby Jamestown Is-

10.

See id.

11. See JAMES K. MATTHEWS, UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND THE
NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET AND THE READY RESERE FORCE: A CHRONOLOGY 2

(1999) (providing a historical timeline of the NDRF).
12.
13.

See id. at 1.
See Patrick Lynch, Ghost Fleet Ship Shifted in Storm, DAILY PRESS (Newport

News, Va.), Oct. 13, 2006, at C6.
14. See Matt Cohen, U.S. Shipbreaking Exports: Balancing Safe Disposal with Economic Realities, 28 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL'Y J. 237, 239-42 (2005).

15. In 2000, the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Maritime and Departmental
Programs of the U.S. Department of Transportation stated in a report to Congress: "These
vessels are literally rotting and disintegrating as they await disposal. Some vessels have
deteriorated to a point where a hammer can penetrate their hulls." Maritime Administration: Limited ProgressIn Disposing of Obsolete Vessels: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. of the Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 106th

Cong. 8 (2000) (statement of Thomas J. Howard, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for
Maritime and Departmental Programs, U.S. Dep't of Transp.).
16. See, e.g., Henry Fisher, Editorial, "Ghost Fleet" Is Still a DisasterWaiting to Happen, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), Feb. 9, 2006, at B10.
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land. 17 In response, MARAD, under the direction of Congress, put
into place a Vessel Disposal Program that seeks the aid of private
investors to dismantle these ships and rid the Chesapeake of this
potential environmental threat.'" Though the program's stated
goal was to dispose of the entire fleet of decaying and potentially
dangerous vessels by September of 2006, tightened environmental standards and other international obstacles combined to
thwart the achievement of this goal. 9
The policy of maintaining a reserve fleet of outdated merchant
ships during peacetime dates back to the years immediately following World War 1.20 The purpose of the policy is to always have
a fleet of ships on hand that can rapidly deploy U.S. forces and
equipment should such a need arise during peacetime. 2' The duty
of managing the fleet originally fell on the U.S. Shipping Board.
In fact, by 1922 the Shipping Board was in charge of overseeing a
fleet of over 1200 retired war-built vessels.22 By the time the U.S.
Maritime Commission was created in 1936 and took over the program, the Shipping Board already had years of experience managing the fleet and had established the practice of selling many of
the older reserve ships for scrap metal and parts.23
Between 1936 and 1946, the fleet contained approximately 500
to 600 ships.2 4 Ships from the fleet were lent to various nations at
the outset of World War II, and the U.S. used other fleet ships at
the beginning of its involvement in the war. 25 At the end of World
War II, Congress passed the Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946,
which authorized the sale of certain government-owned ships to

17. Harper, supra note 4. Ironically, one ship in the fleet recently became a nesting
ground for endangered peregrine falcons. Scott Harper, 'Ghost Fleet' Ship Guards Va. Falcons: A Peregrine Pair Mates Successfully for the Second Year Aboard One Ship, RICH.
TIMES-DISPATCH, June 6, 2007, at B5.
18. See Mar. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., Standing Quotations/Vessel Sales, https://
voa.marad.dot.gov/programs/ship-disposal/standing-quot/index.asp (last visited Nov. 9,
2007).
19. See Constantine G. Papavizas & Lawrence I. Kiern, 2003-2004 U.S. MaritimeLegislative Developments, 36 J. MAR. L. & COM. 379, 396 (2005).
20. See MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 1.
21. Merchant Ship Sales Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 321, § 2, 60 Stat. 41, 41 (codified as
amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1735-46 (2000)).
22. See MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 1.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25.

Id.
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private purchasers.2 6 The act stated that all appropriate government-owned ships, if not sold within an allotted time period,
would be placed in the NDRF.2 7 This fleet was designed to be
available to the government for various national defense and national emergency purposes.2" While government records are not
clear, the fleet likely contained approximately 2000 ships at the
time of its genesis.
In 1950, Congress created the Maritime Administration under
the Department of Commerce to replace the U.S. Maritime Commission.2 9 As one of its first acts, MARAD consolidated its widely
scattered fleet into eight anchorages in the states of New York,
Virginia, North Carolina, Alabama, Texas, California, Oregon,
and Washington.3" As a result of war-time buildup the NDRF
reached its peak at this time, containing over 2200 vessels.3 1 For
the next thirty years the NDRF provided military support and
emergency shipping during seven wars and civilian crises, including the Korean War, Vietnam War, and numerous shipping crises
resulting from tonnage shortfalls.3 2 In 1972, Congress established
an Artificial Reef Program, whereby Liberty ships3 3 in the NDRF
designated for scrapping could be transferred to individual states
for sinking in order to create artificial reefs.3 4 This program remains a feasible option today for the disposal of some NDRF
ships, and over fifty vessels from the fleet have been donated to
individual states to create artificial reefs.3 5

26.
27.
28.
29.

Merchant Ship Sales Act § 2, 60 Stat. at 41.
Id. § 11, 60 Stat. at 49.
See MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 1-3.
See id. at 2.

30.

See MAR. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET

(2005), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/Ship%20Disposal/PRESSNDRFRRF_
4qtrO5.pdf [hereinafter NDRF].
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. Over 2000 Liberty ships were built during the early 1940s, first for use by the UK
through the lend-lease program with the United States and later for use by the United
States as well. Because of the large need for this type of ship during the war, some Liberty
ships were constructed in less than fifty days. See generally JOHN GORLEY BUNKER,
LIBERTY SHIPS: THE UGLY DUCKLINGS OF WORLD WAR 11 (1972) (detailing the history of
Liberty ships).
34. See Pub. L. No. 92-402, § 3, 86 Stat. 617-18 (1972) (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 1220 (2000)). This law was amended in 1984 to include any obsolete vessel in the
NDRF designated for scrapping. See Pub. L. No. 98-623, § 207, 98 Stat. 3394, 3397-98
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1220 (2000)).
35. MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 4.
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Thirty years after the end of World War II, the Navy and
MARAD signed a Memorandum of Agreement that established
the Ready Reserve Force ("RRF") as a subset of the NDRF.36 The
two departments combined to establish the RRF in reaction to a
General Accounting Office report questioning the utility of maintaining a fleet of obsolete vessels.37 The RRF was created from
NDRF vessels that could be called upon at a moment's notice to
rapidly deploy U.S. military forces, and today "the RRF primarily
supports transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment,
combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the critical surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled.""
Beginning with six ships and reaching its peak in 1994 with over
100 ships, the RRF today contains fifty-eight vessels maintained
on four, five, ten or twenty-day readiness status.3 9 The RRF continues to provide significant supplemental support to the U.S.
military. During Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, the RRF deployed forty vessels. 4' The RRF also sent eight
vessels to provide disaster relief to the Gulf Coast following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.4 1
The NDRF today contains a total of 226 vessels,4 2 all anchored
in Virginia, Texas, and California. 43 Forty-four of the vessels are
maintained regularly, some even with skeleton crews, as part of
the RRF.4 4 Another thirty-five vessels in the NDRF are listed as
being in "retention status,"4 5 which means MARAD maintains the
vessels by installing dehumidifiers to prevent mold growth and
cathodic protection systems to prevent exterior and underwater
corrosion.4 6 External painting and cosmetic work is generally de36.

See MAR. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., THE READY RESERVE FORCE (2005)

available at, http://www.marad.dot.gov/ship%20Disposal/PRESSNDRF_ RRF._4qtrO5.pdf
[hereinafter RRFI.
37. See MATTHEWS, supra note 11, at 4.
38. RRF, supra note 36.
39. See id. A current listing of the NDRF and RRF's inventory, updated monthly, can
be found at Mar. Admin., U.S. Dep't of Transp., http://www.marad.dot.gov/offices/ship/re
serveFleet.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
40. RRF, supra note 36.
41. See id.
42. MAR. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
INVENTORY FOR THE MONTH ENDING AUGUST 31, 2007, at 5 (2007), http://www.marad.

dot.gov/offices/ship/Current Inventory.pdf [hereinafter INVENTORY].
43. NDRF, supra note 30.
44. See INVENTORY, supra note 42, at 5; NDRF, supra note 30.
45. INVENTORY, supra note 42, at 5.
46. See NDRF, supra note 30.
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ferred for all vessels, including retention status and RRF vessels.
MARAD is holding a smaller number of NDRF vessels with historical significance for donation or for further evaluation of their
historical significance. 7 This leaves 118 vessels (as of the last official count in February of 2007) that are currently obsolete yet
are not under contract for disposal.4 8 These ships make up the
heart of the "ghost fleet," and their disposal has been the subject
of considerable controversy over the past five years.
II. THE VESSEL DISPOSAL PROGRAM
Most NDRF vessels contain some salvageable equipment or
large quantities of recyclable scrap metal, so the U.S. government
historically has maintained a policy of selling the obsolete ships
to private investors.4 9 These investors in turn would take on the
responsibility of breaking up the ships and abiding by all relevant
environmental regulations. While MARAD disposed of hundreds
of ships in this manner throughout the 1960s and 1970s, shipscrapping essentially ended during the 1980s.5" It was then that
President Ronald Reagan began a policy of naval build-up and invested over $2 trillion in the military."' As a result, significant
funds were spent to convert numerous NDRF ships to active military use, virtually eliminating the need for scrapping operations.5 2 Though ship scrapping resumed in 1991, the discovery of
PCBs on board many of the NDRF vessels led MARAD in 1995 to

47.

See id.

48.

MAR. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PROGRESS OF

THE VESSEL DISPOSAL PROGRAM, at 2 (2007) available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/Ship%
20Disposal/ReportToCongressFinal03 19 07.pdf [hereinafter 2007 REPORT].
49. The former aircraft carrier USS Oriskany recently became the largest vessel sunk
to create an artificial reef. See Susan Cocking, Panhandle'sUSS Oriskany is One of the
World's Largest Artificial Reefs, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 16, 2006, at D6. The Texas Clipperis
the latest ship to be sunk for the purpose of creating an artificial reef. See Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Transp., New Life for an Old Ship: Former Training Ship to Become Artificial
Reef (Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/Headlines/announcements/
2006/TX%20Clipper.htm.
50.

DEP'T OF DEFENSE INTERAGENCY SHIP SCRAPPING REVIEW PANEL, REPORT OF THE

INTERAGENCY PANEL ON SHIP SCRAPPING, pt. 11 (1998), available at http://www.marad.dot.
gov/Ship%20Disposal/Interagency%20report%20on%20ship%20scrapping.pdf [hereinafter
SHIP SCRAPPING].

51. Takako Morita, Note, N.I.M.B.Y. Syndrome and the Ticking Time Bomb: Disputes
Over the Dismantling of Naval Obsolete Vessels, 17 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 723, 726

(2005).
52.

See id.
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decide that these vessels could no longer be exported internationally under U.S. law.5 3 Between 1983 and 1994, MARAD managed
to scrap over 200 vessels almost exclusively through the practice
of selling the ships "as is/where is" to foreign investors who would
then dispose of the ships in foreign countries with lax environmental standards.5 4 With the main method of disposal cut off due
to serious environmental concerns, however, the fleet began to
build back up as more merchant class ships were retired. 5 After
significant news coverage of the build-up and associated environmental accidents during the late 1990s, 56 Congress finally
acted in 2000 in a serious effort to begin to remedy the problem.
The National Maritime Heritage Act of 1994 ("NMHA") originally directed MARAD to dispose of all NDRF vessels not assigned to the RRF or already designated for another purpose by
September of 1999." ' Because little headway was made towards
reaching the original deadline, in September of 2000, Congress
realized that the process would now take much longer than expected. Congress thus included in its 2001 defense budget bill an
amendment to the NMHA that delayed the deadline for disposal
of all obsolete NDRF ships until September 30, 2006.58 Congress
also updated the mandate of the NMHA to comply with environmental regulations for PCBs and directed the Department of
Transportation by statute to dispose of the vessels "in the manner
that provides the best value to the Government, except in any

53. See LOUIS BERGER GROUP, INC., TRANSFER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE RESERVE FLEET
VESSELS FROM THE.JAMES RIVER FLEET FOR DISPOSAL AT ABLE UK FACILITIES, TEESSIDE,
UK: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 5 (2004), available at http://www.marad.dot.gov/pro

grams/Scrapping/web/02-MARAD%20UK% 2OFinalEA%20Text cameraready-062904.pdf.
For a more detailed history of the U.S. domestic laws that have governed the export of
hazardous materials, including PCBs, see Morita, supra note 51, at 737-39.
54. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REP. NO. GAO-05-264, MARITIME
ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVED PROGRAM MANAGEMENT NEEDED TO ADDRESS TIMELY
DISPOSAL OF OBSOLETE SHIPS, at 7 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?

GAO-05-264 [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
55. See id. at 7-8.
56. Gary Cohn and Will Englund were awarded a Pulitzer Prize for their series of investigative articles on the negative environmental consequences of international shipbreaking. These reports are archived at 1998 Pulitzer Prizes-Investigative Reporting,
available at http://www.pulitzer.orglyear/1998/investigative-reporting/works/ (last visited
Nov. 9, 2007).
57. National Maritime Heritage Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-451, § 6(c), 108 Stat.
4769, 4777 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 5405(c) (2000)).
58. See Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Pub. L. No. 106-398 app. § 3502(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1654A-1, 1654A-490 (2000) (codified at 16
U.S.C. § 5405(c)(1)(A) (2000)).
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case in which obtaining the best value would require towing a
vessel and such towing poses a serious threat to the environment."5 9
The 2001 defense bill also contained specific guidance on how
to choose ship-scrapping facilities. The bill stated that facilities
should be able to dispose of vessels "(1) at least cost to the Government; (2) in a timely manner; (3) giving consideration to
worker safety and the environment; and (4) in a manner that
minimizes the geographic distance that a vessel must be towed
when towing a vessel poses a serious threat to the environment."6 ° As is apparent from this guidance, cost has always been
a key issue to determining the fate of the obsolete NDRF vessels.
Unfavorable scrap metal prices between 2000 and 2003, combined
with the fact that only domestic scrapping was considered a viable option under the guidelines, led to less than twenty vessels
being scrapped during this time period.6 1
The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") guidelines contained in the Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA") prohibit the
distribution of materials in commerce that contain PCBs.6 2 Such
materials may only be distributed or used if the Administrator of
the EPA determines that the particular distribution or use "will
not present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment." 3 Even though MARAD does not have the authority to
transfer PCB-laden ships in the NDRF to foreign countries under
current law, the 2001 Act created a pilot program to study
whether international ship-breaking could be done in an environmentally friendly manner.64 The EPA agreed to cooperate
with the pilot program and issued an "enforcement discretion"
letter in May of 2003 "stating that it would not enforce the PCB
export ban against MARAD so long as certain conditions affecting
the disposition of the ships are met."6 5

59.

Id. § 3502(a)(2), 114 Stat. at 1654A-490 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 5405(c)(1) (B)

(2000)).
60. Id. § 3502(b), 114 Stat. at 1654A-490 (2000).
61. See GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 14.
62. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(e)(2)(A) (2000).
63. Id. § 2605(e)(2)(B).
64. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-314, § 3504(c), 116 Stat. 2458, 2755-56 (2002).
65. Basel Action Network v. Mar. Admin. (Basel 1), 285 F. Supp. 2d 58, 60 (D.D.C.
2003).
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Both MARAD and Congress had known for some time that the
target date of September 30, 2006 for disposal of all obsolete vessels was not an attainable goal.6 6 A report by the Government Accountability Office ("GAO") in the spring of 2005 harshly criticized MARAD for not making more progress towards its goal and
stated that the slow progress was due to inept management.6 7
Congress appropriated over $80 million for ship disposal between
2001 and 2004, but MARAD only disposed of twelve percent of its
2001 inventory by 2004 and more obsolete ships continued to join
the fleet during this time.68 The GAO report noted that MARAD
had little transparency in its process of awarding contracts and
stated, "MARAD's ship disposal program lacks the vision needed
to sustain a long-term effort."6 9 The report concluded by cautioning: "As a result of its slow progress, MVARAD will continue to
have a backlog of obsolete and deteriorating ships that pose a
threat to the coastal waterways where they are anchored because
of the toxic materials that they contain." 70 The GAO report made
it clear that MARAD had to employ significant changes for its
domestic Vessel Disposal Program to be effective. Though once
viewed as a possible alternative to the domestic Vessel Disposal
Program, by 2005 it had become clear that the international pilot
program which Congress adopted in 2002 was destined to fail as
well.
III. INTERNATIONAL DISPOSAL PILOT PROGRAM AND
RESULTING U.S. LITIGATION

MARAD has consistently promoted foreign disposal of NDRF
vessels as one way to quickly and economically dispose of the
ghost fleet. 71 Because of widespread opposition to the lax environmental controls involved in international disposal, however,
then-Vice President Al Gore imposed a one-year moratorium on

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

See GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 43.
See id.
Id. at 14, 43.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.

71. See MAR. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE VESSEL DISPOSAL PROGRAM 5 (2005), available at http://www.marad.

dot.gov/Publications/FY%2006/ReportToCongressl l_05%2OFinal%20ver%202-21-2006.pdf
"MARAD continues to believe that environmentally sound facilities exist abroad that offer
the United States very competitive prices for the disposal of MARAD's obsolete vessels.").
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international disposal in 1998.72 It would be another five years
before MARAD resumed its international disposal efforts.
The pilot program, approved by Congress in 2002 and put into
action by MARAD in 2003, renewed interest in international disposal. The program was designed to explore "the extent to which
the cost-effective dismantlement or recycling of obsolete vessels in
the National Defense Reserve Fleet can be accomplished abroad
in [a] manner that appropriately addresses concerns regarding
worker health and safety and the environment."7 3 Though the
program gave MARAD permission to begin multiple pilot programs of no more than four ships each,74 the only pilot program
MARAD pursued was a contract between the agency and PostService Remediation Partners, LLC, a company located in Teesside, England.7"
The contract originally called for the sale of thirteen deteriorating ships and two uncompleted ships to Post-Service Remediation's subcontractor and parent corporation, Able UK.7 6 After
word spread of the contract, though, the Sierra Club and Basel
Action Network ("BAN")7 7 immediately filed a lawsuit in the U.S.
to stop MARAD from dispatching the ships from the Chesapeake

72. See Eric M. Weiss, Ships Anchored in the Past: U.S. "Ghost Fleet" Poses Environmental and Other Dangers, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at Cl. Vice President Gore stated
that the one-year moratorium would be official Clinton administration policy in an executive memorandum delivered to Secretary of Defense William Cohen and Secretary of
Transportation Rodney Slater. See Gary Cohn, U.S. Halts Scrapping of Ships Overseas:
One-Year Ban Ordered in Response to Health, Ecological Concerns, BALT. SUN, Sept. 24,
1998, at Al.
73. Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No.
107-314, § 3504(c)(3)(C), 116 Stat. 2458, 2755 (2002).
74. Id. § 3504(c)(2)(B), 116 Stat. at 2755.
75. See Basel Action Network v. Mar. Admin. (Basel II), 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 61-62
(D.D.C. 2005).
76. See id.; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 54, at 19.
77. The district court later determined BAN to be one of many organizations under
the umbrella of the California non-profit organization "The Tides Center." Basel H1, 370 F.
Supp. 2d at 68. The court stated:
On an organizational chart, the Tides Center would be at the top, with a series of approximately 350 Projects under it. One such Project is the Asia Pacific Environmental Exchange in Seattle. Under each Project is one or more
Sub-Projects. BAN is a Sub-Project under the Asia Pacific Environmental Exchange Project.
Id. BAN describes itself as "the world's only organization focused on confronting global
environmental injustice and economic inefficiency of toxic trade (toxic wastes, products
and technologies) and its devastating impacts." Basel Action Network, About the Basel
Action Network, http://www.ban.org/main/about BAN.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).
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overseas.7" The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia subsequently granted BAN's requested temporary restraining order ("TRO") and limited the transfer to just four
"seaworthy" ships.7 9 Though the plaintiffs argued three reasons
for why the transfer should be stopped, the TRO was solely based
on MARAD's failure to comply with the National Environmental
Policy Act ("NEPA"). ° The Sierra Club and BAN argued that the
transfer violated TSCA, NMHA, and NEPA. 1 The district court
ruled that the plaintiffs had failed to show, for the purposes of a
TRO, a substantial likelihood of success for their TSCA and
NMHA claims, but the court still granted the TRO for nine of the
thirteen ships based on the NEPA claims.8 2 The court explained
that MARAD had prepared a valid environmental assessment
("EA") as required by NEPA for four ships, but "[b]efore sending
any additional NDRF vessels through the Chesapeake Bay and
United States coastal waters, MARAD must perform, at a minimum, a supplemental EA specific to those ships that addresses
the environmental impact of such action in the United States." 3
The TRO for nine of the thirteen ships remained in place for
the next two years, and after briefing and argument of the case
before the district court, the court ultimately dismissed the case
on a motion for summary judgment in the spring of 2005.4 Between 2003 and 2005, the plaintiffs had restated their objections
to include violations of TSCA, NEPA, and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").1 5 The first question the court
addressed in its 2005 decision was whether BAN and the Sierra
Club had standing to sue. After a thorough discussion of the concept of associational standing, the court held that BAN was a
Sub-Project of the Tides Center and thus did not meet the test for

78. Basel 11, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
79. Basel I, 285 F. Supp. 2d 58, 64 (D.D.C. 2003).
80. See id. at 63 (citing National Environmental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, §
102(c), 83 Stat. 852, 853 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (2000))).
81. Id. at 60.
82. Id. at 61-63.
83. Id. at 63. Following the court's decision on the TRO, the first four ships were successfully dispatched to Teesside, England. Basel 11, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 62. The Caloosahatchee, Canisteo, Canopus, and Compassislandall remain moored at a facility operated
by Able UK in England as Able UK continues to pursue the proper permits to begin shipbreaking operations. Id. For the final EA, see LOUIS BERGER GROUP, INC., supra note 53.
84. See Basel 1, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
85. Id. at 63-65. RCRA regulates the storage and disposal of hazardous waste. See 42
U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2000).
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associational standing. 6 Because MARAD did not challenge the
Sierra Club's standing, however, the court found that the organization did have associational standing.5 7
Turning to the merits, the court sided with MARAD for procedural reasons with respect to the TSCA claims.8 8 The court also
ruled in favor of MARAD on the RCRA claims, holding that no
"'imminent and substantial' harm" existed in 2005 to warrant relief under that statute.8 9 The majority of the court's opinion, however, was dedicated to a challenge of MARAD's 2004 EA. The Sierra Club challenged this EA "as failing to consider the impacts of
towing ships across the high seas, failing to analyze each ship
separately, and inadequately considering the alternative use of
only domestic ship-breakers."9" In response to the first challenge,
the court held that NEPA did not require an analysis of environmental effects beyond U.S. territorial waters.9 1 The EA studied
the environmental impact to all U.S. waters that would be used
in the tow, and because of the "customary presumption against
the application of NEPA outside U.S. territorial waters," the
court held that MARAD did all that was required. 92
The plaintiffs also argued that MARAD failed to take a "hard
look" at the possible environmental effects in its 2004 EA before
issuing a finding of no significant impact ("FONSI").93 The plaintiffs claimed that NEPA required a separate EA for each of the
nine ships that still awaited towing to England under the pilot
program.9 4 The court disagreed, holding that "the 2004 EA represents a reasoned 'hard look' at the kinds of materials found onboard that are 'typical of vessels of a similar age and type/

86. See Basel 11, 370 F. Supp. 2d at 70.
87. Id. at 68 n.7, 70.
88. The court explained that the plaintiffs failed to give the United States sixty days
notice before filing their claims as required by statute. Id. at 75.
89. Id. at 78-79 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000)).
90. Id. at 71.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 71 & n.8.
93. Id. at 71.
94. Id. at 72. Of the original nine ships listed in the Able UK contract, the Santa
Cruz, American Banker, and Mormacmoon were sold to a domestic shipbreaker in Texas.
The Donnor and the Protector are also slated to be disposed of domestically. The Cape Isabel, Mormacwave, and American Range are currently under consideration for domestic
ship-breaking as well, leaving the Rigel as the only ship still available to Able UK that
was originally listed in the contract. Id. at 62.
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class."'95 The court also found that MARAD was not required to
conduct an in-depth analysis of tow accidents and noted that
"'[b]etween 1984 and 1994 (when foreign sales were halted), approximately 173 MARAD vessels were towed to overseas locations
for scrapping' without any losses during the tows."96
Finally, the court addressed the Sierra Club's claim that the
2004 EA did not adequately consider the alternative of using only
domestic ship-breaking corporations. The Sierra Club argued that
MARAD's EA was too narrow because it only considered the two
alternatives of tandem tows to the UK and taking no action at
all. 97 The court classified this argument as a "policy disagreement" rather than a valid NEPA claim against an inadequate
FONSI, and thus dismissed the claim.9" The court held that "[iun
context, there were only two alternatives necessary for the 2004
EA to consider, particularly since MARAD [was] already relying
on The Sierra Club's preferred alternative of domestic shipbreaking." 99 With this decision, the court essentially gave
MARAD the green light to transfer all thirteen ships under contract to Able UK, though as discussed below, the decision did not
make international disposal of NDRF vessels a reality.
IV. OBSTACLES TO SHIP-BREAKING IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
Four days after the district court cleared the way for four ships
to be transported to England, the first two departed from Virginia.100 Less than two weeks later, the remaining two ships were
dispatched as well. 1 ' Though everything appeared on course, all
interested parties would soon learn that one procedural defect,
the roots of which dated back to 1997, would derail the entire
program for at least the next four years. Opposition to Able's
plans in the UK began in mid-2003 when a group called Friends
of the Earth alerted the media to potentially disastrous conse10 2
quences from "waste ships" en-route from the United States.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74. Tandem towing is the process of towing one ship behind another.
Id.
Id.
Morita, supra note 51, at 742.
Id.

102.

See ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, US NAVAL VESSELS-LESSONS LEARNED REVIEW 1 1.1
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Though the ships did not carry any waste cargo and had been
stripped of all major PCB-containing parts by MARAD before
transport, 10 3 interest groups characterized the ships in the local
press as "waste ships" from a "toxic fleet." 0 4
The publicity campaign by the program's opponents led to increased scrutiny of Able's ship-breaking plans. In order to begin
operations, Able was required to obtain permits from the local
planning council in Hartlepool, the UK Maritime and Coastguard
Agency, the UK Department for Environment, Food, and Rural
Affairs, and the UKEA. °5 Though Able believed it had received
the necessary permits from all of these agencies, the advocacy
group English Nature suggested in a public hearing in July of
2003 that Able did not have proper permission to construct an integral cofferdam.'o 6
Able received a permit to build the cofferdam in 1997 from the
Hartlepool planning council. English Nature argued, however,
that Able failed to begin construction within the time allotted by
the permit and thus no longer had permission.' 7 The UKEA,
which was represented at this meeting, subsequently contacted
MARAD in mid-September and facilitated contact between
MARAD and Hartlepool.10 8 The UKEA suggested that transfer of
the ships be put on hold until questions regarding proper permission were resolved, though both MARAD and Able ignored this
advice. 10 9 The Hartlepool planning council finally explained to
Able in a letter dated October 7, 2003-one day after the first
ships were dispatched-that while Able had taken some prelimi-

(2004), http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/commondata/103599lessonslearnedus

77

59

45.doc [hereinafter LESSONS LEARNED].

103.

Id. T 1.4.

104. See, e.g., BASEL ACTION NETWORK, NEEDLESS RISK: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S
SCHEME TO EXPORT TOXIC WASTE SHIPS TO EUROPE (Oct. 2003), http://www.ban.org/Li

brary/Needless%20Risk%20Final.pdf; John Vidal, Rusting, Toxic "Ghost Fleet" on Way to
UK, THE GUARDIAN (U.K.), Sept. 3, 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/waste/story/0,12188,
1034598,00.html.
105. See Morita, supra note 51, at 743.
106. ENVIRONMENT, FOOD, AND RURAL AFFAIRS COMM., ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY
INQUIRY INTO UNITED STATES "GHOST SHIPS" IT 25-26 (2003), http://www.environment-

agency.gov.uk/commondata/acrobat/efra -com-evidence_630119.pdf [hereinafter COMMITTEE INQUIRY]. Cofferdams are temporary structures built to exclude water from areas that
are usually submerged. They are commonly used during construction of locks or dry docks.
107. See id $ 26.
2.3.3.
108. See LESSONS LEARNED, supra note 102, 91
109. Id.
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nary steps towards building the cofferdam in 2002, the council
did not consider those actions sufficient to meet the time restrictions contained in the 1997 permit.1 10 Able was thus instructed
that it did not have the council's permission to begin construction
on the facilities necessary to begin ship-breaking.
Completely separate from these proceedings was Able's application to the UKEA to obtain permission to transfer the ships
across the Atlantic Ocean from Virginia to Hartlepool. Able submitted this application in June of 2003 and received a permit
from the UKEA on July 22, 2003.111 Once Able learned that it no
longer had the required permission to begin construction of its
dry dock ship-breaking facility, it informed the UKEA of its plans
to appeal Hartlepool's decision. Able notified the UKEA that
should Able not receive permission for a dry dock, it alternatively
planned to continue its ship-breaking program in a wet dock. 112
After obtaining a legal opinion on how to proceed, in late October
of 2003 the UKEA withdrew the waste management license that
Able needed to begin construction. Though the UKEA had issued
the license just weeks earlier, the agency explained that the issuance had been based on a report that only considered plans for a
dry-dock operation and it was not allowed to issue licenses for
any projects when local permits had not first been obtained.11 3 After conferring with Able and MARAD on possible risks, the
UKEA decided that although the proper permits had not been obtained, the safest course of action was to allow the ships already
en-route to continue their journey."' The four ships arrived in
mid-December of 2003 and have been docked at Able's facility
since then.1 15
The UK High Court's Administrative Court has supervisory
and appellate jurisdiction for decisions of the UKEA and Hartlepool planning council.' 1 6 The High Court conducted a series of
hearings in December of 2003 regarding the legality of the

110. COMMITTEE INQUIRY, supra note 106, 27.
111. See Environment Agency, U.S. Naval Ships: A Synopsis of the Issue, http:
//www.environment-agency.gov.uklregions/northeast588494/752576/?Version=l&lang=-e
(last visited Nov. 9, 2007) [hereinafter Synopsis].
112. See COMMITTEE INQUIRY, supra note 106, 32.
113. See id.
33-34.
114. See Synopsis, supra note 111.
115.
116.

See id.
See PETER CANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 8 (2d ed. 1992).
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UKEA's permit withdrawal and Hartlepool's determination that
Able had failed to acquire the proper building and ship-breaking
permits. 7 On December 18, 2003, Justice Sullivan released a
lengthy opinion that addressed numerous issues relating to Able's
permits, but stated the question presented as: "What is the mean1 i Justice Sullivan held
ing of the 1997 planning permission?""
that Able did not have the proper permits in place to begin dismantling the ships.11 9 Able had received permission in 1997 for
the "[d]ismantling/refurbishment of redundant marine structures
and equipment."' 12' The council and Able had argued that ships

qualified as "marine structures, '121 but Justice Sullivan disagreed, holding, "In ordinary language a ship is no more described as a 'marine structure' than a car is described as a 'highway structure', a narrowboat a122 'canal structure', or a steam
locomotive a 'railway structure'."
The claimants in the application before the court challenged
the legality of a letter sent by a Hartlepool council member to
Able on September 30, 2003.123 The letter expressed the council
member's view that Able obtained the proper permits needed to
begin ship-breaking. 124 The court held that no decision was contained in the letter, however, and described the letter as "merely
an informal expression of an officer's view" before granting the
claimants "a Declaration to the effect that the words 'marine
structures' in the 1997 planning permission do not include
ships." 125 In his decision, Justice Sullivan ordered that Able
would be prevented from beginning work until it obtained the
proper permission. 121
After receiving word from the High Court in December of 2003
that it did not have the proper permission to begin work, Able began drafting new applications for the Hartlepool planning council.
The company spent the next year preparing its applications and
117. Morita, supra note 51, at 744.
118. Gregan v. Hartlepool Borough Council, [2003] EWHC (Admin) 3278, [16] (Eng.),
availableat http://www.bailii.orgew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2003/3278.html.
119. See id. at [88].
120. Id. at [18], [35].
121. Id. at [29].
122. Id. at [35].
123. Id. at [1].
124. Id.
125. Id. at [88].
126. Id.
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accompanying environmental statement, and in January of 2005
it submitted the new applications. 127 Because of the high level of
public interest in the project, numerous objections were made. 121
Able worked with the council throughout 2005 in responding to
requests for further information and updated its applications
three times. 129 After Able finalized the applications, the council
held three public notice and comment sessions and reviewed 485
letters and five petitions in opposition. 130
The opposition letters stated nearly seventy reasons why Able's
applications should be denied. 131 Chief among the arguments presented was the idea that the U.S. should be responsible for its
own waste. 13 2 Those in opposition feared that approving Able's
applications would open the door to more ships from the ghost
fleet and possibly other types of toxic waste. 133 Other environmental concerns were expressed, including potential harm to a
nearby environmental sanctuary and danger to birds from wind
turbines that were part of Able's proposed facilities. 134 Many local
citizens also opposed the applications for purely economic reasons. They argued that the presence of deteriorating ships in
Hartlepool's harbor and reputation as a foreign toxic waste site
would damage the town's growing tourism industry. 135 The council received only nine letters in support of Able's applications.
Those letters highlighted several facts: Able's project would bring
jobs to the community; little toxic waste was involved in the shipbreaking process; and no other government agency had outstanding objections to the project. 136
On October 12, 2006, the Hartlepool planning council finally
addressed Able's applications. After Able's representatives ex-

127. See Hartlepool Borough Council, Planning Committee Minutes and Decision Record, Oct. 12, 2006, at 5 (Nov. 6, 2006), http://www.hartlepool.gov.uk/downloads/06.11.06
_- Planning-Committee Agenda-l_.pdf [hereinafter Hartlepool Minutes].
128. See id. at 4-5.
129. Id. at 5.
130. See Hartlepool Borough Council, Planning Committee Agenda, at 13, 16 (Oct. 12,
2006), http://www.hartlepool.gov.uk/downloads/12.10.06_-_Planning-CommitteeAgenda
1_ .pdf [hereinafter Hartlepool Agenda].
131. Id. at 14-16.
132. See id. at 13.
133. See id.
134. See id. at 13-16.
135. See id. at 13.
136. See id. at 17.
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plained the technical details of the company's applications to the
council, those in opposition had the chance to speak. Individuals
opposing the applications cited a survey that found that ninetytwo percent of town residents were opposed to the applications
and pleaded for the council not to turn the town into a "toxic
waste dump."'3 7 Additionally, those opposed cited Able's spotty
environmental record, which included over 300 citations by the
UKEA and two revoked environmental permits. 3 ' After further
questioning and discussion by the council, a motion to deny the
applications was made and seconded.1 39 A vote was then taken,
and each application
was denied by a margin of ten or eleven
40
one.'
to
votes
The explanation accompanying each denied application was
short and conclusive. The council stated five reasons for denying
Able's applications, first citing the possibility of a "significant adverse effect on the integrity of nearby sites of ecological importance."'
Second, the council noted that the applications presented a risk of a "significant adverse effect on the health and
well being of people living near to the application site by reason of
potential emissions to water and air."' 42 Third, the council noted
that Able's prediction of over 700 new jobs had not been independently verified, and even if the project did create jobs, the
benefit would not outweigh the negative environmental impact. 143
The council next cited the argument that Able's project would
hurt tourism, before finally stating that it was the council's belief
that importation of waste materials was against earlier Council
Directives.'
Able tried to convince the council to reconsider its
denial in the days following the October 12, 2006 meeting, but its
efforts were unsuccessful.' 45 The council's denial became official
with the public release of its decision on November 6, 2006.146
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Hartlepool Minutes, supra note 127, at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 6-12.
Id. at 12-14.
Id. at 12-13.

142.

Id.

143. Id. at 13. In response to questions regarding the creation of jobs, Able's representatives estimated that 239 jobs would be created in decommissioning work and 510 workers would be needed for construction of a wind turbine. Id. at 7.
144. Id. at 13.
145. See Mike Blackburn, Anger over Ships Plans, EVENING GAZETTE (Middlesbrough,
Eng.), Nov. 7, 2006, Local News, at 4.
146. Press Release, Hartlespool Burough Council, Council Rejects Able UK Planning
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Able stated that it would appeal the decision to the High Court,
though it believed that a completely new application responding
to the concerns of the council would be more successful. 147
Though Hartlepool presented five reasons for denying Able's
permit applications, only one of the five reasons can remotely be
considered a "legal" ground for denial. The council's first stated
reason of opposition-environmental concerns 14 8-represents little more than an overture to the many environmental interest
groups that registered their opposition. Able's environmental
statement was never challenged as legally inadequate, and the
UKEA stated publicly that it had no objections, environmental or
otherwise, to the applications. Even though Able submitted detailed plans regarding its environmental safeguards, those plans
were ultimately ignored in the council's decision. The council's
second environmental objection, regarding the health and wellbeing of the town's citizens, has even less merit. The only environmental effects mentioned in Able's application was noise customarily associated with normal construction and the increased
use of the roadways around the dock site because of the large
number of jobs the project would create. For the council to list
these concerns as an official reason for rejecting the applications
shows that the decision was made almost purely on policy
grounds, ignoring the fact that the applications met all relevant
legal requirements.
The council's argument that Able failed to verify job creation
predictions"' is equally unfounded. No group, either in written
objections or at the planning meeting, accused Able of falsifying
its prediction that the project would create more than 700 jobs.
Because the environmental consequences were relatively minor
for a project of its size, the council's assertion that uncertain job
predictions were outweighed by environmental considerations
also demonstrates the lack of a well-reasoned denial. Similarly,
the council's argument that Able's project would hurt Hartlepool's
Request (Nov. 6, 2006), available at http://www.hartlepool.gov.uldsite/scripts/newsarticle.
php?newsID=499.
147. See Press Release, Able UK, Ltd., Disappointment Over Ships Contract-But Appeal Continues (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.ableuk.com/ableshiprecycling/
press-able-070530.html; see also Helen Cook, No U-Turn over "Ghost Ships," N. ECHO
(Parlington, Eng.), Nov. 7, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/sea
rch/display.var.1006444.ono uturn_over-ghost-ships.php.
148. See Hartlepool Minutes, supra note 127, at 12-13.
149. See id. at 13.
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tourism is without merit. No evidence was presented at the council meeting that the town even has a viable tourism industry,
much less one that would be impacted by the presence of ships being recycled in its harbor.
Finally, the council did put forth one colorable legal argument
to support its denial of Able's application. The council stated that
importation of foreign waste was in conflict with earlier Council
15 The problem with this argument is that the council
Directives."
voted in 1997 to approve roughly the same project, and no mention of a policy against importation of waste was made at that
time. If the importation of foreign waste did in fact conflict with
earlier Council Directives, the council could easily overrule the
earlier directives or classify the ships as obsolete vessels being
imported for recycling purposes rather than waste. The lack of
any compelling legal argument in the council's October 12 decision shows that the denial was nothing more than a reflection of
public sentiment against importing an American problem.
After the October 2006 denial by the Hartlepool town council,
MARAD decided that international disposal in the United Kingdom was no longer feasible. MARAD subsequently renegotiated
its 2003 contract with Able to only cover ship-breaking for the
four ships already delivered to Able, along with the two unfinished ships, at a cost of $10.1 million-assuming that Able could
successfully obtain the proper permits to begin ship-breaking
sometime in the future.15 1 By the spring of 2007, eight of the nine
ships originally part of the contract had already been disposed of,
and plans were in place to dispose of the ninth ship by the end of
2008.152 The renegotiation essentially reformed the contract to reflect the reality of the situation. Even so, the fact that MARAD
agreed to keep giving incentives to Able to complete its contract
in the United Kingdom was met with opposition by other domestic ship-breaking companies. 153

150. See id.
151. U.S. Ends Junk-Ship Deal with British: Permit Delays Held Up Firm's Scrapping
of 'Ghost Fleet' Vessels, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Va.), June 11, 2007, at B5.
152. David Lerman, Revised Deal Ends One of Fights over Ghost Fleet, DAILY PRESS
(Newport News, Va.), June 2, 2007, at B1. For more information on these eight ships, see
supra note 94.
153. Southern Scrap Material Company filed a request with the U.S. Comptroller General in the summer of 2007 to void and re-bid Able's contract because the price seemed too
high and the contract with Able had not been released publicly. Scott Harper, Two More
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V. CONCLUSION

The Hartlepool planning council's October 12, 2006 decision
appears to be one of the latest examples of a phenomenon commonly seen in the toxic waste disposal debate. The phenomenon,
known as "Not in My Backyard," or NIMBY, is one of the main
obstacles to increasing the rate of disposal for NDRF ships in the
United States.'54 While all parties involved would like to see the
vessels disposed of quickly and in an environmentally friendly
manner, ship-breaking companies have often encountered strong
resistance while attempting to build the necessary facilities.1 55
Luckily, favorable scrap prices have recently spurred growth in
the U.S. domestic ship-breaking industry.'56 That fact, along with
an increased economic commitment from Congress towards the
Vessel Disposal Program, has combined to steer the domestic
ship-breaking program in the right direction. ' Today eight companies have been certified by MARAD as qualified to compete for
domestic recycling contracts, and seven of those companies have
either begun or already completed some ship-scrapping projects
in the United States.15 Even with these developments, however,
Congress and MARAD are not moving fast enough to avert a possible environmental disaster.
Because the 2003 pilot program only gave MARAD permission
to pursue international disposal options and enter into contracts
during 2003,159 further exploration of environmentally friendly
international disposal options is not currently a possibility.
Though Able UK was not successful in its bid to start operations
in England to dispose of American ships, Congress should nonetheless give MARAD the flexibility to enter into contracts with

Rusted Vessels are Slated to be Scrapped, VIRGINIAN-PILOT (Norfolk, Va.), June 14, 2007,
at Dl.
154. See Morita, supra note 51, at 727-28.
155. One ship-breaking company made headlines in Oregon after its plans to build a
wet dock ship-breaking facility there were rebuked by the state government. See Editorial,
Only in Dry Dock: The Governor Gets it Right, OREGONIAN (Portland, Or.), Feb. 11, 2006,
at B4 (supporting Governor Kulongoski's decision to allow ship-breaking only in dry
docks).
156. See Paul Glader, Hot Metal: With Steel Soaring,A Ghost Fleet Is in High Demand,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2006, at Al.
157. Congress increased funding for the Vessel Disposal Program between 2004 and
2005 from $16.1 million to $21.6 million. See Morita, supra note 51, at 731.
158. See 2007 REPORT, supra note 48, at 1-2.
159. See Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 3504(c)(2)(A), 116 Stat. 2755, 2755 (2002).
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other qualified international ship-breaking companies in the future. Congress should also study the possibility of amending the
TSCA to make it easier for international disposal projects to gain
approval in a timely manner. 6 ° If Congress takes these actions,
international disposal could once again become a viable option to
help speed the rate of ghost fleet disposal.
The U.S. ship-breaking industry and the Vessel Disposal Program have both come a long way in the past fifty years. Instead of
selling the obsolete NDRF vessels to the highest international
bidder and sending the ships off to be disposed of in countries
with lax environmental standards, MARAD now pays domestic
ship-breaking firms to scrap the vessels in the United States.
Companies such as Chesapeake, Virginia's Bay Bridge Enterprises have proven this model can work, as evidenced by the
number of contracts the company repeatedly has won in recent
years from MARAD and the company's ability, so far, to avoid environmental complaints.'6 1 Before 2005, the Vessel Disposal Program featured poor management, slow progress, and a failure to
discover any real solutions. Fortunately, with the GAO's 2005 report and recent expansion of domestic companies such as Bay
Bridge, it appears that Congress and MARAD are finally beginning to make real progress in disposing of the ghost fleet. Congress should continue these efforts by increasing funding for the
domestic Vessel Disposal Program, giving MVARAD the ability to
pursue other environmentally friendly international disposal options, and continuing to work with private ship-breaking companies to ensure that the ghost fleet continues to be disposed of in
an environmentally friendly but efficient manner.

David Killion

160. In particular, Congress should consider creating an exception to 15 U.S.C. §
2605(e)(2)(A) (2000).
161. See Bay Bridge LLC, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/bay-bridge.
htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007); see also Range Bayer, Virginia Dept. of Environmental
Quality's (DEQ) Reconnaissance Inspections of In-water Shipbreaking at Bay Bridge Enterprises LLC During May-November 2005, http://www.oregonvos.net/-rbayer/salvage/
vdeq.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007).

